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Many people have questioned the need for academic tenure. Both higher
education literature1 and the popular press 2 are filled with articles concerning the subject. This article addresses whether tenure continues to be needed
as we move into the new millennium. Specifically, the argument that
contemporary First Amendment protections make tenure superfluous is
examined. Part I describes the history of tenure. The purpose of tenure is
* B.S., J.D., Ed.D. (candidate). Associate Professor, Criminal Justice and Legal Studies,
University of Central Florida.
** Portions of this article have previously appeared in Professor Hall's article, entitled
Sustained Performance Review: A Threat to Academic Freedom, published in Kappa Delta
Pi's, 62 EDUCATIONAL FORUM 25-31 (1997).
1. See, e.g., RICHARD CHArT & ANDREW T. FORD, BEYOND TRADITIONAL TENURE: A
GUIDE TO SOUND POLICIES AND PRACTICES (1982); RICHARD T. DE GEORGE, ACADEMIC
FREEDOM AND TENURE: ETHICAL ISSUES (1997); BARDWELL L. SMITH ET AL., THE TENURE

DEBATE (1973); Mary Burgan, Considering Tenure: Keep the Teacher at the Heart of
Education, 76 EDUC. REC. 34 (1995); Constance Hawke, Tenure's Tenacity in Higher
Education, 120 EDUC. L. REP. 621 (1997).
2. See, e.g., Editorial, Accountability Takes Rightful Place with Paychecks, Academic
Freedom, FT. LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, Oct. 2, 1996, at 26A; Ralph Reiland, Should
Colleges and Universities Abolish Academic Tenure? Yes: Let the Magic of the Market Place
Invigorate the Sheltered Elites in the Ivory Tower, INSIGHT MAG., Nov. 25, 1996, at 24.

3. Several arguments have been made in support of, and counter to, tenure. Many are
economic. Only the First Amendment aspect of tenure is discussed herein. For a discussion
of the economic aspects of tenure, see Robert W. McGee & Walter E. Block, Academic
Tenure: An Economic Critique, in DE GEORGE, supra note 1, at 156-75; Richard McKenzie,
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examined in part II. Part III examines the law of tenure. Part IV identifies
the First Amendment argument in opposition to tenure. In part V the reasons
the First Amendment does not obviate the need for tenure are presented.
I.

HISTORY OF TENURE

The idea of protecting academic inquiry from external influences is of
medieval origin. Walter Metzger documented the history of academic tenure
in a report published in 1973. 4 According to Metzger, the roots of tenure
can be traced back as early as 1158, when Holy Roman Emperor Frederick
Barbarossa issued an edict protecting scholars. 5 Other nations followed
Barbarossa's lead.6 During the Middle Ages, Catholic popes appointed
scholars to important positions and government leaders bestowed privileges
upon them.7 These privileges, however, were dependent upon the good will
of the bestowing power.8 Not content with the transient nature of their
security, scholars sought a degree of independence and security of a more
permanent nature. 9 They did this by creating the progenitors of the modern
university.' ° Several different types of institutions were created, including
communitas, collegium, societas, and consortium." In time, they acquired
the right to elect their own officers and to create their own governing
rules. 2 These institutions obtained legal status. 13 Like corporations in the
United States today, they could sue and be sued as a group. 14 Membership
in the body was determined by the body itself and was dependent upon
qualifications such as earning degrees, the exhibition of certain skills, and the
acquisition of a license. 5 Continued membership was dependent upon
"adherence to collegial comities."' 6 In Metzger's words, "tenure as

In Defense of Academic Tenure, 152 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 325-41 (1996).
4. Walter P. Metzger, Academic Tenure in America: A HistoricalEssay, in COMMISSION
ON ACADEMIC TENURE IN HIGHER EDUCATION, FACULTY TENURE: A
RECOMMENDATIONS 93-159 (1973) [hereinafter COMMISSION].

REPORT

AND

5. Id. at 94.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 94-95.
8. Id. at 95.
9. Id. at 95-96.
10. Id. at 96. Charles Haskins points out that while the Greeks and Romans educated
their youth, they did not have "universities." CHARLES HOMER HASKINS, THE RISE OF
UNIVERSITIES 1 (1957). "A great teacher like Socrates gave no diplomas; if a modem student
sat at his feet for three months, he would demand a certificate, something tangible and
external to show for it." Id.
11. Metzger, supra note 4, at 96.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 96-97.

14. Id. at 96.
15. Id. at 101.

16. Id.
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privilege was a declaration of opposition to any academic sanction from any
nonacademic source."' 7 Conformity to peers, not individuality, was stressed
in the early European university.' 8 Even though this early form of tenure
was more an institutional privilege than an individual one, banishment from
the institution was taken very seriously, and scholars were first afforded due
process.19

This academic tradition made its way to England and subsequently, to the
United States.2" The Reformation, the desire for control of the academy by
monarchs and governments, and other events transformed the academy.2'
One change was the loss of its independent corporate character.22
America's first academic institutions, which came into being in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, were modeled after the Anglo-version
of the academy. 23 As a result, early American colleges lacked the autonomy of the early European universities.24 Instead, early American colleges
were governed externally. 25 In addition, teachers in these institutions were
not highly regarded scholars as were those in the early European bodies;
rather they were lower status teachers who served at the will and pleasure of
college presidents.26 During this period, the employment relationship
between a professor and a university was defined by contract.2

7

Most

contracts covered a period of three years, and renewal of a contract was
determined by the college president.2 8 One notable exception to the contract
system was the establishment of endowed chairs at Harvard College in the
late eighteenth century.29 These positions were de facto tenured.30 The
distinction between the highly prestigious endowed chairs and the lesser
respected and more vulnerable professors created a class system at Harvard
that appears to be the origin of the system of academic ranks in universities

17. Id.

18. Id. at 101-02.
19. Id. at 102-03. Metzger notes that the act of removing a master was referred to as a
privatio (privation) or exilium (banishment), not dismissal. Id. at 103. This reflects the
attitude that a master was not an employee of the university, rather, he was "a corporate
director." Id.
20. Id. at 107.
21. Id. at 107-10.
22. Id. at ll.
23. Id. at 113.
24. Id. at 111-13.
25. Kathryn M. Moore, Introduction: Academic Tenure in the United States, 31 J.C. &
U. PERSONNEL ASS'N 1, 3 (1980).

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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that continues today.3' The early American universities also lacked the
investigative spirit that is now present in the academy. "The early American
college was concerned largely with preserving current knowledge and
promoting morality. The faculty of these colleges would hardly be
characterized, either then or now, as an independent group of scholars
searching for new arrangements in science and society and considering new
systems of values."32

An important date in the history of tenure is 1913, when a group of
professors at John Hopkins University formed the American Association of
University Professors (AAUP).33 The goals of the early AAUP included the
development of a set of standards for the tenure and termination of professors
and the establishment of a committee to investigate allegations of breaches
of academic freedom.34 Central to the AAUP's philosophy is the belief in
academic freedom of thought and action. The AAUP issued its first report
in 1915.36 It has issued several subsequent reports, the most influential
being its 1940 General Report on Academic Freedom and Academic
Tenure.37 The AAUP's position was, and continues to be, that tenure is
necessary to protect academic freedom.38 Its standards provide that
professors are to remain in a probationary period no longer than seven years,
that all professors, tenured and nontenured, be afforded full academic
freedom, and that tenure be terminated only for adequate cause or financial
exigency. 39 In short, the AAUP sought to reestablish the autonomy of the
professorate. 4° The AAUP's efforts have had a significant impact on tenure
in higher education.4 Tenure became well established during what Moore
refers to as the golden age of tenure, 1955-1965. 4 This was a consequence
of the increased authority of academics resulting from a significant increase
in the market demand for them.4 3

31. Id.
32. Harold T. Shapiro, The Privilege and Responsibility: Some Reflections on the Nature,
Function, and Future of Academic Tenure, Address Before ACE & AAUP Joint Conference
(Aug. 24-26, 1983), in ACADEME, Nov.-Dec. 1983, at 3a, 5a.
33. Moore, supra note 25, at 4.
34. Id.
35. See id.
36. Id. at 5.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 6.
42. Id. at 7.
43. Id. at 6.
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H.

TENURE AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM

The AAUP's intent in promoting tenure was not to establish a profession4
of ivory tower elites financially disassociated from the general public.
Instead, the AAUP posits that tenure serves the public by protecting
academic freedom.4 5 The public is best served by having professors
(experts in their disciplines) who are free to research, instruct, and comment
without concern for the popularity of their ideas.46 The ability to explore
new concepts, challenge the status quo, and present controversial or new
ideas is thought to contribute to the technological and social progress of the
community.4 7 As such, the tenure debate should not be reduced to a
discussion of whether individuals should possess tenure.48 Instead, the
dialogue should focus on49the utility of academic freedom and whether tenure
is needed to preserve it.
II.

THE LAW OF TENURE

Academic tenure has been defined as "an arrangement under which
faculty appointments in an institution of higher education are continued until
retirement for age or physical disability, subject to dismissal for adequate
cause or unavoidable termination on account of financial exigency or change
of institutional program."5 ° Many states and private institutions have
adopted this definition of tenure or one substantially similar to it.5"
In most institutions, tenure is awarded after certain criteria have been
met.52 Length of service (commonly six years), teaching ability, research
productivity, collegiality, and service to the university and community are
often factors in the tenure decision.53 The process of obtaining tenure
varies, but it usually involves several layers of review by faculty, ad-

44. See Richard T.De George, The Justification of Academic Tenure, in DE GEORGE,
supra note 1, at 9.
45. Id.
46. See id. at 13-14.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 13.
49. See McGee & Block, supra note 3, at 159-75 (critically discussing the relationship
between tenure and academic freedom); Richard Rorty, Does Academic Freedom Have
PhilosophicalPresuppositions?,in DE GEORGE, supra note 1, at 176-96 (critically discussing

the philosophical aspects of academic freedom).
50. COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 256.

51. See id. at 1-2.
52. See Report of the AAL Special Committee on Tenure and the Tenuring Process, 42
J. LEGAL EDUC. 477, 484 (1992).

53. At many institutions, tenure and promotion to the next highest academic rank occur
simultaneously. The criteria for tenure and promotion may be different.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 10

ministrators, and external authorities."
The award of tenure is a
university's recognition of a faculty member's competence, and it creates a
rebuttable presumption of outstanding performance.55
A.

Establishing and Terminating Tenure

In addition to being an academic status, tenure is a legal status. 56 The
legal aspects of tenure differ between private and public institutions.57 In
the private sector, tenure is secured through contract. 5s Accordingly, in a
private institution, the termination of tenure and other adverse employment
actions raise contract and regulatory issues. In the public sector, tenure is
secured through contract, 59 statutory,' administrative, 61 and constitutional
law. 62 The termination of a tenured professor raises the same issues in a
state institution as it does in a private institution, including important
constitutional issues.63 There are two constitutional provisions important in
this analysis, the right to free speech found in the First Amendment and the
64
right to due process found in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
These amendments protect tenure substantively and procedurally.
B.

FirstAmendment Protection

Although the text of the First Amendment refers only to "speech, ' 65 the
Supreme Court has interpreted it as protecting some forms of expression.66
54. William H. Daughtrey, Jr., The Legal Nature of Academic Freedom in United States
Colleges and Universities, 25 U. RICH. L. REV. 233, 242 (1991).
55. William Van Alstyne, Tenure: A Summary, Explanation, and Defense, AAUP BULL.
328, 329 (1971).
56. Hawke, supra note 1, at 625-33.
57. Daughtrey, supra note 54, at 251.
58. Hawke, supra note 1, at 630.
59. Id.
60. FLA. STAT. § 240.245 (1997).
61. FLA. ADMIN. CODE U.C. 6C-5.940.
62. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. There is a large body of law concerning the contract
aspects of tenure, including whether faculty handbooks, university manuals, and other
documents establish tenure systems. For a discussion of the law of this area, see Ralph D.
Mawdsley, Litigation Involving Higher Education Employee and Student Handbooks, 109
EDUC. L. REP. 1031-49 (1996).
63. State regulations, including an institution's rules, statutes, and judicial review
standards (e.g., arbitrary and capricious standards that apply to much administrative action)
all must be considered in all personnel decisions made in state colleges and universities. The
statutory and regulatory aspects of university employment are beyond the scope of this article.
64. The Fifth Amendment secures the right of due process against the federal government,
and the Fourteenth Amendment does the same against the state governments.
65. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
66. See Kingsley v. Regents of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684 (1959); see also Hurtley v. IrishAmerican Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) (stating that the
Constitution protects expression in parades beyond just "written or spoken words");
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The First Amendment protects academic endeavors whenever they fall under
the expression umbrella.67 Academic freedom has been defined as including
the freedom to decide who may teach, who may be a student, what content
may be taught, and what instructional methods may be employed.68
Although the Supreme Court has never adopted this precise formulation of
academic freedom, one Justice referred to it in a concurring opinion.69
The Supreme Court has stated that society at large benefits from having
free thought and expression in the nation's universities and colleges.7 ° In
Sweezy v. Wyman, a 1957 case, the Court posited:
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American
universities is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the
vital role in a democracy that is played by those who guide and train
our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders
in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our
Nation. No field of education is so thoroughly comprehended by
man that new discoveries cannot yet be made. Particularly is that
true in the social sciences, where few, if any, principles are accepted
as absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of
suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must always remain
free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and
understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.7 1
In Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 72 issued ten years later, the Court
went further and indicated that academic freedom holds a special place in
First Amendment free speech jurisprudence.
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic
freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely
to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special
concern of the First Amendment . ...

"The vigilant protection of

Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995) (stating that "[i]n
the realm of private speech or expression, government regulation may not favor one speaker
over another") (emphasis added); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (stating that
conduct is protected as speech whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends to express
an idea); Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of the State of New York, 360
U.S. 684, 690 (1959) (holding that the First Amendment protects motion pictures).
67. J.Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom:A "Special Concern of the FirstAmendment," 99
YALE L.J. 251, 256 (1989).
68. 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (citation omitted) (Frankfurter, J.,concurring).

69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id. at 250.
Id.
385 U.S. 589 (1967).
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constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community
of American schools." The classroom is peculiarly the "marketplace
of ideas." The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through
wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth
"out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of
authoritative selection."7 3
Accordingly, the First Amendment can stand alone in protecting faculty
from pernicious university decisions in some circumstances. Tenured or not,
a faculty member cannot be terminated for expressing unpopular opinions.74
This protection is at its peak in the classroom, 7 but also includes extracurricular speech.76 For example, Pickering v. Board of Education involved
a teacher who sent a letter that disagreed with the position held by the school
board and superintendent of schools on school funding.7 7 The school
discharged him for providing inaccurate information to the public, impugning
the integrity of the school board members, creating controversy and conflict,
and creating a disruptive environment.78 The Pickering Court established
a balancing test for First Amendment claims arising in the academy that
continues today. 79 The public's interest in the content of the teacher's
speech was weighed against the institution's interest in harmony, order, and
efficiency.8"
Applying this test, the Supreme Court recognized the need for harmony
in the workplace, but nonetheless found that "absent proof of false statements
knowingly or recklessly made by him, a teacher's exercise of his right to
speak on issues of public importance may not furnish the basis for his
dismissal from public employment."' 8' Accordingly, the Supreme Court
reversed the school board's termination of the teacher.

73. Id. at 603 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960); United States v.
Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (1949), respectively) (citations omitted)) (alteration
in the original).
74. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968); see Waters v.Churchill, 511
U.S. 661, 674 (1994) (stating that "a government employee, like any citizen, may have a
strong, legitimate interest in speaking out on public matters, [and] ... the government may
have to make a substantial showing that the speech is, in fact, likely to be disruptive before
it may be published"); Jeffries v. Harleston, 52 F.3d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that "the
First Amendment protects a government employee who speaks out on issues of public interest
from censure by his employer unless the speech actually disrupted the employer's
operations").
75. Dube v. State Univ. of New York, 900 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S.

1211 (1991).
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
Id. at 564.
Id. at 566-67.
Id. at 568.
Id.
Id. at 574 (footnote omitted).

1998]
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Due Process Protection

The due process clauses mandate fair treatment of citizens by federal and
state governments. They provide that life, liberty, and property shall not be
deprived without due process of law.82 Under due process analysis, tenure
is treated as a property right.83 Due process has two aspects, substantive
and procedural. The former limits the reasons for which tenure can be
revoked. In the tenure termination context, substantive due process is
concerned with the underlying reason, motivation, or policy decision that has
led to the termination of tenure. As such, most First Amendment violations
also implicate substantive due process. Procedural due process requires that
a faculty member whose employment is threatened be provided with notice
of an impending action, a fair hearing, and a fair judge. 84 Due process does
not preclude an adverse employment action from occurring. On the contrary,
What they demand,
the due process clauses presume lawful deprivations.
however, is fairness. Accordingly, tenure is not a guarantee of lifetime
employment. But tenure does limit the circumstances under which a
professor may be terminated, and it proscribes the procedures that must be
employed in the termination process. Generally, there are two reasons tenure
may be terminated: administrative necessity and just cause.86
Administrative necessity refers to academic or financial circumstances
that demand elimination of a faculty line or academic program.87
Elimination of a faculty line due to dwindling enrollment in an academic
program is an example. Financial exigency is also a valid reason to
One court defined financial
terminate the faculty of the program.88
exigency as an "imminent financial crisis" that threatens the survival of the
institution. 89 The same court stated that termination of tenured faculty
Of
during such a crisis is lawful only if no lesser alternatives exist.'
91
Pretextual terminations will
course, universities must act in good faith.

82. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
83. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985); Board of Regents

v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 575 (1972). Liberty interests exist as well, but are outside the scope
of this article.
84. Michael J. Phillips, The Substantive Due Process Rights of College and University
Faculty, 28 AM. Bus. L.J. 567, 569 (1991).

85. Id.
86. Id. at 586-87.
87. Id. at 587-88.
88. Bignall v. North Idaho College, 538 F.2d 243, 249 (9th Cir. 1976).
89. Linn v. Andover Newton Theological Sch., Inc., 874 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1989).
90. Jimenez v. Almodovar, 650 F.2d 363, 368 (1st Cir. 1981) (using the term
"unavoidable" termination).
91. See id.
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be reversed by the courts.92 Generally, nontenured faculty members must
be terminated before tenured faculty in these circumstances, unless good
cause can be established for doing otherwise.93
In addition to administrative necessity, tenured faculty members also may
be terminated for just cause, often termed "good cause" or "adequate cause"
in administrative regulations, collective bargaining agreements, and other
higher education laws. 94 Substantive due process and other constitutional
provisions, such as the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause, limit the
authority of the state in defining just cause. That is, just cause cannot be
defined to include what is otherwise protected by the Constitution. What
behaviors may constitute just cause? Incompetence has been recognized as
just cause. 95 Academic dishonesty, fraud, and immorality may also justify
terminating tenure.96

Insubordination justifies termination, so long as the alleged insubordinate
behavior impairs the individual's ability to perform lawful duties or seriously
disrupts the functioning of the university. In Garrett v. Mathews,97 a
tenured faculty member of the University of Alabama was terminated for
insubordination.9 8 The professor refused to post his office hours, keep his
office hours, provide his chair with a list of his publications, open mail from
his chair, and accept telephone calls from his chair. 99 The trial court found
these acts to be adequate justification to terminate the plaintiff's tenure."
Unlawful discrimination and harassment of students, employees, or peers
also justify discipline. 10 ' Of course, if termination is justifiable, then a
lesser form of discipline is likely to be legitimate as well. For example, a
tenured faculty member who is found to be incompetent may be subjected to
a plan to improve performance or may be suspended pending improvement.
IV. TENURE QUESTIONED
Several arguments have been made favoring the abolition or restructuring
of tenure. 10 2 One argument cuts to the core of academic freedom. It has
92. See Phillips, supra note 84, at 591.
93. See Jimenez, 650 F.2d at 368.
94. See Phillips, supra note 84, at 589-91.
95. Agarwal v. University of Minn., 788 F.2d 504, 508 (8th Cir. 1986).
96. Mueller v. University of Minn., 855 F.2d 555, 558-59 (8th Cir. 1988).
97. 474 F. Supp. 594 (N.D. Ala. 1979), affd on different grounds, 625 F.2d 658 (5th Cir.
1980).
98. Id. at 597.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 599.
101. See Phillips, supra note 84, at 589-90 & n.122.
102. There have been proposals to totally eliminate tenure, use multiyear employment
contracts, encourage early retirement, and implement post-tenure review. Hawke, supra note
1, at 624. Several state and private institutions are experimenting with these options. Id.
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been asserted that tenure has outlived its usefulness in the United States
because today, unlike many years ago, the First Amendment's free speech
provision protects academic freedom.' °3 C. Peter Magrath, for example,
stated that the introduction of First Amendment protections has resulted in
an uncoupling of academic freedom and tenure.' °4 However, this theory
has one major flaw: it rests upon the untrue assumption that the First
Amendment and tenure are coextensive and coequal in protecting academic
freedom.
V. WHY TENURE Is NECESSARY
While it is true that contemporary interpretation of the First Amendment
has broadened the free speech protection of faculty members beyond what it
was many years ago, it does not protect academic freedom as effectively as
tenure. For the First Amendment to be as effective as tenure, faculty must
be as willing to pursue First Amendment causes of action as they are
termination of tenure decisions. Also, the scope of First Amendment
protection of academic freedom would have to parallel or exceed the scope
of protection provided by tenure. Both of these requirements are unmet in
several regards. First, First Amendment protection of academic freedom does
not extend to all faculty members. Second, the First Amendment's scope is
limited to expression, and accordingly, many research, curricular, and
administrative activities that are protected by tenure are not protected by the
First Amendment. Third, enforcement of a First Amendment claim by a
tenured faculty member is procedurally and substantively more difficult than
a claim for unlawful termination. Fourth, nontenured faculty are not as likely
to enforce their rights as are their tenured counterparts.
A.

Unprotected Faculty

The First Amendment limits the authority of the federal government, and
through incorporation, the authority of the states, but it does not apply to
private relationships. Faculty at private institutions do not enjoy either First
Amendment or due process protection except in the rare case where state

Two states, Florida and Arizona, have created tenureless universities. Robin Wilson, Tenure:
Contracts Replace the Tenure Track for a Growing Number of Professors, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., June 12, 1998, at A12. Other public and private universities have abolished tenure for
new faculty hires. Id. Florida is one of several states that now require post-tenure review
throughout their state university systems. See Daniel Hall, Sustained Performance Review:
A Threat to Academic Freedom?, 62 EDUC. FORUM 25, 29 (1997).
103. C. Peter Magrath, Eliminating Tenure Without DestroyingAcademic Freedom, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 28, 1997, at A60.

104. Id.
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action can be established. 5 However, private universities must comply
with their own procedures,' °6 and at least one court has held that they must
provide "fundamentally fair" procedures, regardless of contractual
obligations.'0 7 The court did not identify the constitutional source of this
obligation. 0 8 The fact that private faculty are excluded from First
Amendment protection calls into question the effectiveness of the First
Amendment in protecting academic freedom since twenty-nine percent of all
university and college faculty are employed by private institutions." °
B.

UnprotectedAcademic Activities

While the First Amendment clearly protects classroom speech, it does not
protect all academic activities. Whether an expression is conduct or pure
speech is important in First Amendment analysis. Pure speech will usually
receive greater protection than conduct, but in either case, the courts will
employ the Pickering public concern balancing test. Examples of pure
speech related to academics but not protected by the First Amendment can
be found. In Williams v. Alabama State University, a 1997 case, the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that a nontenured professor's
repeated criticisms of a book written by a university administrator and used
at the university did not involve a sufficiently important public concern to
outweigh the administration's interest in terminating his employment." °
A similar result had been reached in Ballard v. Blount"' fourteen years
earlier. In Ballard, a professor's claim that his criticism of a syllabus raised
a public concern entitling him to First Amendment protection was
rejected." 2 The court found his contention that the public has an interest
in having quality syllabi to be unpersuasive. '13 The court opined that if it
extended First Amendment protection to his speech, then all faculty speech

105. In the rare case against a private college, a plaintiff may be able to satisfy the state
action requirement. For example, a private university was found to be a state actor where the
university was chartered by the state, received state funds, and the rules at issue in the case
were the result of state pressure. Albert v. Carovano, 824 F.2d 1333, 1339-41 (2nd Cir.
1987).
106. Fellheimer v. Middlebury College, 869 F. Supp. 238, 242 (D. Vt. 1994); Bennett v.
Wells College, 641 N.Y.S.2d 929, 932 (App. Div. 1996).
107. Psi Upsilon v. University of Pa., 591 A.2d 755, 758 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
108. See id.
109. NATIONAL CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., PUB. No. NCES 98-015,
DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 1997, at 239 tbl.225 (1997) (reporting data from fall 1970
to fall 1993).
110. 102 F.3d 1179, 1183 (1lth Cir. 1997).
111. 581 F. Supp. 160 (N.D. Ga. 1983), aftd, 734 F.2d 1480 (1 1th Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1086 (1984).
112. Id. at 163-64.
113. Id.
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would be entitled to protection, and the court was not willing to cast the net
that wide.' 4 The Pickering test is fact sensitive, and no bright line of
demarcation between protected and unprotected speech can be drawn.
However, it appears that nearly all speech concerning the appropriate use of
resources and the expenditure of state monies is entitled to protection.115
Also, speech concerning academic matters can implicate public concern when
substantial issues, such as accreditation, the ability to prepare students for the
workplace or graduate school, or general concerns about the performance of
students, are involved." 6 The pure speech that is not protected by the First
Amendment, such as in the Williams and Ballard cases, would likely be
protected by tenure. Ironically, it appears that in this context the First
Amendment and tenure have an inverted relationship. The fact that the
issues are not "significant" leads to the conclusion that the First Amendment
does not apply. Yet, it is the same insignificance of these matters that would
likely prevent the university from establishing just cause for dismissal of a
tenured faculty member.
Academic conduct, such as freedom to assess student performance and
issue grades, is entitled to even less protection than is pure speech. While
the Supreme Court has stated that grading is an expert function of professors
with which the courts will not lightly interfere," 7 it has not had occasion
to define the relationship between the individual faculty member and the
institution in this context. Two lower court decisions are informative. In
Lovelace v. Southeastern Massachusetts University," 8 a 1996 First Circuit
Court of Appeals case, a nontenured faculty member whose contract was not
renewed filed a First Amendment claim against the University." 9 He
claimed that his contract was not renewed because he had refused to lower
his grading standards. 120 While the court found grading to be expression,
it also opined:
[M]atters such as course content, homework load, and grading policy
are core university concerns ....

To accept plaintiff's contention

that an untenured teacher's grading policy is constitutionally
protected and insulates him from discharge when his standards
conflict with those of the university would be to constrict the
university in defining and performing its educational mission. The

114. See id.

115. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571; United Carolina Bank v. Board of Regents, 665 F.2d
553, 561-62, 564 (5th Cir. 1982).
116. Maples v. Martin, 858 F.2d 1546, 1553 (11th Cir. 1988).
117. Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1978).
118. 793 F.2d 419 (1st Cir. 1986).
119. Id. at 425.
120. Id.
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that each nontenured professor be
First Amendment does not require
1 21
made a sovereign unto himself.
In an earlier Sixth Circuit case that involved facts similar to Lovelace, a
comparable but more developed analysis of the law can be found. In Parate
v. Isobar,22 an untenured professor claimed that his grading standards and
personality differences had caused administrators not to renew his
employment contract. 12 3 Like the First Circuit, the Sixth Circuit recognized
grading as expression. 124 The court stated that "to compel the professor to
alter [a] grade would severely burden a protected activity." 125 Central to
the court's rationale was its conclusion that grading is central to the
professorial function and that it would interfere with instruction, a protected
activity, to allow universities to compel professors to issue particular
grades.1 26 The court noted that while a professor may not be ordered to
assign a particular grade to a student, the "professor does not escape the
reasonable review of university officials in the assignment of grades,"' 27
and therefore, a university may change a student's grade when a professor
refuses. The court did not address the circumstances under which administrative grade changes are justified, nor did it consider the impact
administrative grade changes might have on academic freedom. This
decision cannot be read as granting carte blanche to administrators over
grading since administrative grade changes could discourage free expression
by altering interpersonal relations with students and colleagues. 128 It is
unclear whether the Sixth Circuit's analysis will be adopted nationally.
The status of research is also important in this context. Some commentators have concluded that research is an expressive activity entitled to First
Amendment protection.129 However, the Supreme Court has not ruled on

121. Id. at 426 (citation and footnote omitted).
122. 868 F.2d 821 (6th Cir. 1989).
123. Id. at 823-26.
124. Id. at 828.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 828-30.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 829. In some circumstances, an administrative grade change may not only be
academically sound, but legally required. A low grade that is the result of race or sex
discrimination is an example. On the other side, however, is a grade change that bears a close
nexus to speech. For example, a student refuses to acknowledge subject matter on an exam
with which he disagrees. The information is generally accepted in the discipline, but
controversial. The student suffers a low grade as a result of his refusal to include the
information in the final exam answer even though the material was part of the course
curriculum. It would be injurious to free speech for an administration that agrees with the
student's political position to administratively change the grade upward.
129. June Coleman, Playing God or Playing Scientist: A ConstitutionalAnalysis of State
Laws Banning Embryological Procedures, 27 PACIFIc L.J. 1331, 1386 (1996); Gary L.
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this issue. The decision may rest on the nature of the individual research
project, that is, the degree to which a researcher is engaged in expression as
opposed to conduct, the degree to which the inquiry itself involves
expression, and whether the final product of the research is itself expressive,
for example, a published article or report. Some commentators have opined
that even if a research activity is mostly conduct, it may be protected by the
First Amendment.130 Under the so-called precursor theory, research activity
that leads to protected expression is treated as expression itself.13 1 So, if
a researcher intends to publish the results of the work, the First Amendment
would protect the research conduct to a greater extent than if the research
were conducted with no expressive product. 132 However, the Supreme
Court could reject precursor theory and define "expression" more narrowly.
The result of such an interpretation of the First Amendment would be to
exclude most research activity from First Amendment protection. Regardless
of what direction the Supreme Court takes when it finally addresses this
issue, it is likely that some research will remain unprotected. Again, tenure
fills in a very wide gap. These are only a few examples of academic
activities that are not fully protected by the First Amendment. Other
curricular, service, and research activities also are without First Amendment
protection, but are equally important to academic freedom.
C.

Willingness to Litigate: Legal Burdens

Tenure status impacts litigation both substantively and procedurally. The
substantive aspects (for example, good cause for termination) were discussed
above. The opponents of tenure often overlook that tenure also impacts
litigation procedure. An untenured faculty member who believes she has
been discriminated against in violation of the First Amendment bears the
burden of proof at trial. This burden includes both the burden of production
and the burden of persuasion. On the other hand, a tenured faculty member
who suffers adverse employment action only bears the burden of production.
That is, the faculty member need only assert that the termination was
unlawful. Then the burden of establishing good cause for termination falls
on the defendant. This burden shifting is important in preserving the tenure
right. Because employment decisions are multivariate and often subtle, it is
not difficult for employers to justify employment decisions when there are
few legal limitations on the reasons for which employees may be terminated.

Francione, Experimentation and the Marketplace Theory of the First Amendment, 136 U. PA.

L. REv.
130.
131.
132.

417, 418-19 (1987).
Coleman, supra note 129, at 1386; Francione, supra note 129, at 418-19.
Coleman, supra note 129, at 1389.
Id.; Francione, supra note 129, at 430.
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While this empowerment of employers is sensible in a free market, it makes
proving unlawful termination difficult. This is why burden shifting is also
employed in race, age, and gender discrimination cases. 133 In these cases,4
13
the burden to establish a prima facie case first rests with the employee.
To satisfy this burden, the employee must show that he suffered an adverse
employment action and falls into a protected class. 135 The burden then
shifts to the employer to proffer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the
action. 13 6 If the employer can show a nondiscriminatory reason, the burden
of proving that the employer had a discriminatory motive shifts to the
employee. 137 Just as it would be difficult for a minority employee to prove
discriminatory motive at the outset, it would be equally difficult for a tenured
professor who has been terminated to prove the negative proposition that
good cause for termination did not exist. After all, an employee may be
unaware of the subjective motives of administrators. In addition, it is likely
that much of the evidence supporting a university's decision to terminate a
faculty member is within its control. Accordingly, the burden falls on the
university to establish good cause for termination of a tenured professor. The
untenured faculty member, on the other hand, faces the difficult burden of
proving that it was First Amendment protected expression that had motivated
administrators to act. Again, this is difficult to prove because of the
multivariate nature of employment decisions.
Tenured faculty also enjoy the right to a pretermination hearing.138 The
Supreme Court has held that due process requires a limited pretermination
hearing of public employees whose employment may be terminated only
upon a showing of good cause. 139 The purpose of the hearing is to
determine whether cause for termination exists.' 4° The employee must be
provided with an opportunity to respond to the allegations at a pretermination
hearing,' 4 1 with a more extensive fact-finding hearing to be conducted after
termination. 142 Untenured faculty members do not enjoy the right to a
pretermination hearing.

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 804.
See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546.
Gilbert v. Homar, 117 S.Ct. 1807, 1811 (1997); Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546.
See Gilbert, 117 S. Ct. at 1811 (citing Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545-46).

141.

Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 543.

142. Id. at 546.

1998]

ACADEMIC TENURE

D.

Willingness to Litigate: PersonalBurdens

The differences in procedure for tenured versus nontenured faculty
discussed above are likely to affect a faculty member's willingness to litigate
or otherwise enforce a legitimate First Amendment claim against a university.
Personal burdens, opinions, and beliefs may also discourage individuals from
pursuing a legal remedy. In spite of a common belief to the contrary, people
are generally reluctant to become embroiled in litigation. Researchers have
found, for example, that only a small percentage of colorable tort claims are
ever litigated.'43 There are many reasons for this, including unfamiliarity
with legal rights and how to enforce them, aversion to litigation, attribution
of fault,'" unwillingness to devote the time and energy required for
litigation, the expense of enforcement, 145 social pressures,' 6 and difficulty in proving a claim.
An untenured faculty member may also be dissuaded from litigating a
First Amendment claim by the expenses of litigation. A contract professor
whose contract is not renewed or who has only a few months remaining on
a terminated contract does not have the same financial interest in enforcing
his rights as does a tenured professor. While a claim might be pursued as a
matter of principle, academic freedom is too important to the public to be
wedded to such motivations of individuals. Adjunct instructors are even

143. See Richard L. Abel, The Real Tort Crisis-

Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 443,

448 (1987) (discussing several studies). One researcher found that only 10% of persons
injured through negligence file claims, and only 6.7% of malpractice victims make claims.
Id. (citing PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 19-21, 23 (1985)); see also DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR
ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1991) (describing theoretical models and
surveying the law); ELIZABETH M. KING & JAMES P. SMITH, ECONOMIC Loss AND

COMPENSATION IN AVIATION ACCIDENTS (1988) (describing theoretical models and surveying
the law).
144. Hensler presents a "fault and equity" model in her text. HENSLER ET AL., supra note
143, at 146. Pursuant to this model, two critical elements must be present before an
individual will file a claim: (1) attribution of cause and fault, and (2) individual's perception
of some inequity in the situation. Id.
145. Several economic models have been developed that attempt to predict whether an
individual will sue following an injury, as well as whether parties will settle their disputes
using alternative methods. See id. at 148 & n.6.
146. See Abel, supra note 143, at 452-61 (discussing social factors influencing the
willingness of tort victims to sue). Researchers have found, for example, that employers
pressure employees not to sue, middle economic class neighbors are less likely to sue each
other than are lower economic class neighbors, and rural residents are less likely to sue than
urban residents. Id. In another study, researchers found that neighbors in a New England
town avoided litigating their disputes for fear of antagonizing their neighbors and losing
control of the situation. Sally Engle Merry & Susan S. Silbey, What Do Plaintiffs Want?
Reexamining the Concept of Dispute, 9 JUST. SYS. J. 151, 172-73 (1984), cited in Marc
Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 10-11 & n.31 (1986).
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more unlikely to pursue a First Amendment remedy. They possess less
financial interest in their continued employment than do visiting or full-time
contract professors. For the reasons stated above, the time, expense, and
difficulty experienced by an untenured faculty member in litigating
termination have larger implications than that of a tenured faculty member.
This problem is greater than individuals not enforcing their legal rights. In
an era of perceived excessive litigiousness and legalism, some people
welcome procedural barriers that may discourage litigation. Regardless of
whether this attitude is justified generally, it is inappropriate in academic
freedom cases because a public concern is at issue. Members of the public
at large do not have standing to challenge an encroachment of academic
freedom by administrators in denying or revoking tenure, but the individual
faculty member does. So, while the First Amendment has proven to be
critical in the development of the substantive aspects of academic freedom,
its direct enforcement is not the best method of protecting those principles.
For that, tenure is more effective.
The decreased probability of enforcement by untenured faculty is made
more significant by that group's representation in the academy. Untenured
faculty comprise thirty-five percent of the total full-time higher education
instructor population in the United States, 147 and untenured part-time and
full-time faculty account for fifty-eight percent of the total higher education
48
faculty population of the United States.
VI.

CONCLUSION

While the First Amendment plays an important role in protecting free
speech on campuses, it does not obviate the need for the protections of
tenure. Plans to eliminate tenure in favor of contract systems are particularly
distressing. As shown above, the First Amendment leaves a considerable
number of university and college professors without a remedy and many
important academic activities completely unprotected. On the other hand, the
First Amendment does not discriminate between tenured and untenured
faculty. Thus, it protects academic freedom in some instances where tenure
does not. Accordingly, the First Amendment should not be used as a reason
to eliminate tenure, instead the two should be understood to compliment one
another in creating an environment where faculty can feel a measure of legal
protection from oppression of expression, ideas, and research.

147. NATIONAL CTR. FOR EDUC.
1995-96).

STAT.,

supra note 109, at 257 tbl.240 (including data from

148. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, REPORT ON THE STATUS OF
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